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Abstract
We study alternative mechanisms facing adverse selection and moral hazard, as well as the
problems of collusion and free-riding, which are often ignored in the literature. We derive
the optimal monitoring mechanism and show that it solves free riding and collusion problems.
However, with different types of agents, the optimal mechanism needs to also solve an “assign-
ment problem,” which, coupled with the need to generate incentive for monitoring, prevents
the optimal monitoring mechanism from attaining full second best efficiency. The paper then
considers an alternative mechanism in which some agents are simply given gatekeeping pow-
ers: they can either allow or block any investment project. The mechanism allows rent extrac-
tion through side payments from investors to the gatekeepers. A gatekeeping mechanism with
competing gatekeepers attains first best efficiency, and is also proof against collusion between
investors and gatekeepers by construction.
We show that the crucial issue for the success of monitoring is whether monitors can be penal-
ized for false reporting. Without this assumption monitoring reduces to gatekeeping. Further,
the crucial assumption for gatekeeping to succeed is that gatekeepers behave in a competitive
manner. The results provide an explanation for the observed institutional choices: monitor-
ing is typical in informal collectives, whereas government regulation of investment (licensing,
issuing permits etc) leads naturally to gatekeeping.
KEYWORDS: Monitoring; Gatekeeping; Informal credit collective; Licensing; Collusion; Free riding in
monitoring; Corruption
JEL CLASSIFICATION: O12, D82, D78
1a.daripa@bbk.ac.uk, Mail: Dept. of Economics, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet
Street, Bloomsbury, London WC1E 7HX, UK.
1 INTRODUCTION
Monitoring mechanisms are in widespread use in informal credit institutions.(2) If an
investor has private information on factors affecting the outcome of a project, the op-
timal individual investing decision might not be efficient, creating scope for socially
useful costly monitoring of the investment decision by other agents. We study the
problem of optimal monitoring design and show how agents can be endogenously as-
signed to the roles of investors and monitors, how any potential free rider problems in
monitoring can be solved, how monitors can be induced to carry out costly monitoring,
and identify the condition crucial for the success of this mechanism.
While the monitoring mechanism is the usual focus of the literature on informal col-
lectives, we show that the problem of ensuring efficient investment has an alternative
solution. We construct a mechanism in which some agents are simply given gatekeep-
ing powers: they can either permit or block any investment project. The mechanism
allows rent extraction through side payments from investors to the gatekeepers. Such
mechanisms are widely observed in the context of public regulatory bodies and con-
comitant rent extraction. When governments regulate investment, agents who issue
licenses, permits etc. act as gatekeepers, and in a corrupt system, extract side pay-
ments.
We show that an optimally designed gatekeeping mechanism achieves first best effi-
ciency and outperforms optimal monitoring. This shows that even for informal collec-
tives, monitoring is not necessarily the best solution, and also shows that corruption is
not necessarily a detriment to efficient investment.
However, this also begs a question about observed institutional choice: monitoring is
typical in informal collectives, whereas government regulated investment leads nat-
urally to gatekeeping. We show that the crucial issue for the success of monitoring
is whether monitors can be penalized for false reporting, and that for gatekeeping is
whether gatekeepers can be induced to behave in a competitive manner. Next, the
advantage of gatekeeping over monitoring vanishes if the cost of monitoring goes to
(2)The term “informal” denotes a variety of credit arrangements that rely on self-enforcement rather
than on formal contracts enforced by external agents such as courts of law. Such institutions can have
detailed rules, and adherence is often ensured through incentives born of social interactions. Examples
include credit cooperatives, group loans, and rotating savings and credit associations.
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zero. Further, if monitors cannot be effectively penalized, monitoring reduces to gate-
keeping, so that the latter is the only possible system. Finally, if the monitors can
be penalized, optimal monitoring is proof against collusion either among monitors or
between monitors and investors. The gatekeeping mechanism, on the other hand, ex-
plicitly allows side payments from investors to gatekeepers and therefore there are no
further concerns about collusion between these groups. However, if gatekeepers can
themselves collude, the gatekeeping mechanism performs poorly, dissipating invest-
ment incentives.
These factors shed some light on the observed institutional choice. Typically, informal
collectives arise in settings in which agents have strong social connections. This makes
it possible to have a strong center. But equally, this allows the possibility of collusion
between agents. The monitoring mechanism is unaffected by any type of collusion,
and if gatekeepers can collude, monitoring is the better choice. Therefore if the cost of
monitoring is not very high, and there is a possibility of collusion, the advantage from
the collusion-proofness of monitoring is likely to outweigh its disadvantages.
The results also have implications for the study of corruption. In a pioneering series
of articles collected in Shleifer and Vishny (1998), the authors characterize government
failures as “grabbing hand,” distinct from “helping hand.” One aspect of the former is
corruption, which Shleifer and Vishny (1993) define as the sale by government officials
of government property for personal gain (e.g. the collection of bribes for issuing per-
mits). Such studies implicitly assume that a gatekeeping mechanism is in place, and
analyze the distortions arising from it. As we noted above, if the implementing centre
is itself weak, the monitoring mechanism coincides with the gatekeeping mechanism.
Thus the only mechanism available to a weak government (which is unable to take
monitors to task) is gatekeeping, and therefore this system is the natural setting for the
analysis of corruption. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that weak governments can-
not, at any reasonable cost, prevent rent extraction by government agencies in issuing
complementary permits.(3) They note that if these agencies can freely enter, they drive
the cumulative burden of bribe on an investor high enough to preclude investment.
The results here show that the problem can be solved if gatekeepers have competitors
(i.e. several agents can issue a license, permit etc.). We show that under competitive
gatekeeping, the optimal mechanism solves the allocation problem so that the right
(3)See also Murphy et al. (1993).
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agents have an incentive to invest and others become gatekeepers, and further, the
mechanism induces the investors to invest in an efficient manner. Thus the best option
for a weak government might be to induce competition among corrupt agents rather
than try to remove corruption. However, if gatekeepers can collude, we get back the
Shleifer-Vishny result - gatekeeping dissipates investment incentives.
Let us now clarify the model and the results in greater detail. We consider a setting
with a continuum of agents. Each agent has a project which, if invested in, can either
succeed or fail. The probability of success of a project depends on both the type of
a project and on whether the agent puts in an effort. Project type is drawn from a
uniform distribution on the unit interval. Both type and effort of an agent is private
information, and each agent must decide whether to invest.(4)
First, consider the problem of designing a monitoring mechanism. In a collective
organization using a monitoring mechanism, each agent could either become a non-
borrowing member (i.e. decide to not invest and potentially serve as monitor), or an
investor. Once agents choose their roles, investors learn their own cost of putting in an
effort, which could be high or low. High cost makes effort unprofitable, but no effort
is inefficient. Efficiency requires that only types above a certain cutoff invest, do so
only when they have a low cost of effort, and put in an effort. The role of a monitor
is to learn (by incurring a cost) the cost of effort for an investor and report back to the
centre, which then decides whether to approve a loan to the investor.
Investment, to be worthwhile, must pay at least as much as monitoring, and types be-
low a cutoff should have the incentive to become non-borrowing members and serve as
monitors. The division of agents between investors and potential monitors is thus en-
dogenous, and the payoff structure needs to be designed carefully to avoid inefficient
investment. We refer to this adverse selection problem of dividing agents between
investors and non-borrowing members as the “assignment problem.”
An optimal monitoring mechanism must satisfy individual rationality and budget bal-
ance, and implement an efficient assignment of agents to roles of investors and moni-
(4)As Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) point out, there are four major problems facing lenders - gaining
knowledge about the quality of borrowers (adverse selection), ensuring correct choice of effort once the
loan is made (moral hazard), learning about of the outcome of investment (costly state verification), and
enforcement of repayment. This paper focuses on the first two problems, and assumes that the outcome
of investment is observable, and repayments enforceable.
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tors. We assume that the center is “strong” in the sense that there are social sanctions
available so that if monitors who submit false reports can be punished. This ensures
that monitors cannot falsely report high cost. However, they could still choose not to
monitor and report low cost. Thus the mechanism must also induce monitors to un-
dertake (costly) monitoring. Finally, if collusion among monitors or between monitors
and investors is possible, the mechanism must also be collusion-proof.
We characterize the optimal monitoring mechanism and show that it is proof against
collusion among monitors as well as between monitors and investors. The mecha-
nism assigns a single monitor for each investor, which preempts free-riding problems.
Given that monitoring is costly, the best possible outcome under monitoring is sec-
ond best. While an optimal mechanism is collusion-proof, it turns out that solving the
assignment problem, coupled with the need to provide incentive to monitor, requires
sacrificing efficiency in some cases. Thus the optimal monitoring mechanism fails to
attain second best efficiency. However, at the limit as the cost of monitoring goes to
zero, the incentive-to-monitor constraint ceases to matter, and first best efficiency is
attained.
Next, suppose the strong center assumption is removed, so that monitors can ask in-
vestors for a bribe to submit a favorable report. In this case monitors effectively become
gatekeepers and it is better to design a gatekeeping mechanism taking this possibility
into account explicitly.
In a gatekeeping mechanism, each investor requires a permit from a gatekeeper to in-
vest, and a gatekeeper can arbitrarily refuse to issue a permit. Investors can make side
payments to gatekeepers. We show that with competitive gatekeepers, gatekeeping
outperforms monitoring and attains first best. Thus in an ideal world, gatekeeping is
the optimal mechanism.
The basic intuition for this result is as follows. Under monitoring, the problem of
efficient assignment coupled with the need to generate incentive to monitor creates
inefficiency. Gatekeepers, on the other hand, face exactly the opposite problem - un-
der optimal payments, a gatekeeping mechanism sets the incentive to deny a permit.
Thus the default is to deny access to credit - and it is the informed party (investor) who
must get the gatekeeper to grant a permit by making appropriate side payments. Once
the gatekeeper’s payoffs from denying a permit is set correctly, it induces separation
among investors - only investors with a low cost of effort can afford the side payments
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necessary to procure a permit. Thus while monitors need to be given an incentive to
seek information (because monitoring is costly), it is the informed who seek gatekeep-
ers, and reveal private information about own cost of effort through side payments. At
the same time, competition among gatekeepers limits their surplus extracting ability.
These two factors together make competitive gatekeeping more effective than moni-
toring.
As it allows for side payments, a gatekeeping mechanism takes into account all possi-
ble collusive arrangements between gatekeepers and investors at the outset. However,
if gatekeepers could collude, the mechanism fails to solve the assignment problem ef-
ficiently and dissipates the incentive to invest.
RELATING TO THE LITERATURE ON INFORMAL CREDIT ORGANIZATIONS
Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990) introduced the idea of monitoring by peers who are
likely to have better information about the investors compared to outside lenders. Or-
ganizations such as credit cooperatives usually have both borrowing and non-borrowing
members, and an important feature of successful cooperatives is that the latter have an
incentive to monitor the former. While there is a large literature on such collective
credit organizations, there is relatively little work on optimal peer monitoring design
in such organizations. An important contribution in this regard is by Banerjee et al.
(1994). They model a cooperative with a productive agent who borrows funds and
invests, and a non-investing agent who can lend own funds to the cooperative, and
potentially monitor project choice by the investing agent. They show that by setting
the extent of internal borrowing (borrowing from non-investing agent), the extent of
the monitor’s liability and the interest rate paid on the internal funds, the cooperative
induces the non-investing agent to monitor investment.
However, as Besley(1995a,b) points out, there are two important problems with such
mechanisms that are usually ignored in the theoretical analysis. The first problem is
the possibility of collusion between a monitor and an investor. Informal organizations
such as cooperatives can harness the fact that individuals have much better informa-
tion about each other compared to outside bodies and generate peer monitoring, but
the fact that individuals know each other well also makes collusion likely. Second,
when there are many potential monitors, and monitoring is costly, peer monitoring
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incentives could be diluted by the possibility of free riding.
The analysis of Banerjee et al. (1994) does not consider possibility of collusion, and with
a single non-borrowing member the possibility of free-riding does not arise. Further,
the assignment problem does not arise since they exogenously specify a borrowing
and a non-borrowing agent. This paper, in contrast, analyzes these problems. The
assignment problem is solved endogenously. Further, the paper explicitly considers
the possibility of collusion between monitors and investors. With many agents, the
potential for free-riding among monitors is present as well.
The issue of incentive design also plays a central role in the related literature on group
lending with joint liability(5). In group lending schemes, the focus is on small, relatively
homogeneous groups of borrowers who are jointly liable for a loan to any member of
the group. Joint liability fosters incentive for each borrower to monitor the others.
While similar concerns about collusion and free-riding arise in this setting as well,
there are important differences in the structure of incentive constraints. First, since
all members of a group are investors, there is no assignment problem. Second, each
members serves both as an investor and a monitor. Thus the incentive structure for
generating monitoring are somewhat different. Laffont (2000) and Laffont and Rey
(2000) adopt a mechanism design approach to consider the problem of collusion in the
setting of joint liability. Finally, as Besley and Coate (1995) demonstrate, under joint li-
ability the issue of strategic default becomes important when the outside lender cannot
easily observe the outcome of investment. Armenda´riz de Aghion (1999) analyzes the
optimal design of collective credit agreements with joint liability given the possibility
of strategic default. This does not address the issue of collusion. Papers by Besley and
Jain (2000), and Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004) study the design of group lending incentives
under collusion in the context of strategic default.
2 THE MODEL
There is a continuum of agents. Each agent can either earn a safe return or invest in a
risky project. Without loss of generality, set the net safe return to 0. Each investment
project requires an indivisible investment of 1.
(5)See Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) for a survey.
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Agents are assumed to have zero initial wealth.(6) The rate of return from production
is a random variable that can take two values: 0 and R > 1. The state with realized rate
of return R is called “success,” and the other state is called “failure.” The probability
of success of a project depends on the project’s “type” as well as the effort of the agent.
Project “type” denotes the intrinsic success probability (i.e. quality) of a project. This
is a random variable p with a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Types are independent
across projects.
Throughout the paper, the term “effort” is used to denote the provision of private
inputs (e.g. in agriculture - quality and quantity of fertilizer, quantity of water, quantity
of workers hired to plant seeds, the quality of the seeds used). An agent could either
actively provide private inputs (provide effort), or make little or no effort. With effort,
success probability of a project is given by p, the project’s type. Without effort, on the
other hand, success probability is reduced to αp, 0 < α < 1.
The cost of effort, however, depends on the state of nature. Under a favorable envi-
ronment, which occurs with probability θ, the cost of effort (cost of private inputs for
maintaining a probability of success of p for type p) is CE. With probability (1− θ),
the environment is unfavorable, and in that case the cost of effort rises to CE + ∆. Each
project draws a cost of effort independently of others.
To summarize, if effort is taken, and the cost of effort is low, the total resource cost is
1+ CE. If the cost of effort is high, a further ∆ must be spent to take high effort.
We make the following assumptions:
αR < 1.
Thus low effort by any type is socially suboptimal. Second, ∆ is high enough so that
R− (CE + ∆) < 1.
Thus when the cost of high effort is high, investment is socially undesirable.
The type of a project as well as the cost of effort and whether effort is provided are the
agent’s private information. Investment is observable, ruling out direct consumption
of a loan. Further, the outcome (success or failure) of investment is also observable,
and thus repayment contracts are enforceable.
(6)The payoff schemes here can be readily ported to a setting of positive own wealth, and payoff for
monitoring can then be interpreted as return on internal borrowing from monitors.
7
2.1 FIRST-BEST INVESTMENT
If cost of effort is high for a project, efficiency requires that it is not operated. Under
low cost of effort, investment should proceed so long as the expected net return (with
effort provided by the agent) is positive, i.e. pR− CE − 1 > 0. Therefore the first-best
investment cutoff (denoted pfb) is given by pfbR = 1+ CE, i.e.
pfb =
1+ CE
R
. (2.1)
We assume that R > 1+CE. This implies that the first best cutoff is smaller than 1 - i.e.
the first best investment level is positive.
We explain the details of monitoring and gatekeeping mechanisms in sections 4 and 5
respectively.
3 INEFFICIENCY WITHOUT MONITORING (OR GATEKEEPING)
A general form of repayment contract is given by (T, TF), where T is the payment
made by the investor in the success state and TF is the payment in the failure state.
From limited liability, TF ≤ 0. If TF < 0 (i.e. if the investor is paid when project fails),
the incentive to take high effort is diluted, and at the same time reduces the payoff of
the bank. Thus any optimal contract sets TF = 0. Therefore, without loss of generality,
a repayment contract can be specified simply as a payment T in the success state.
In the absence of monitoring (or gatekeeping), for there to be a positive measure of
agents who invest with high effort when cost of effort is low, it must be that
p(R− T)− CE ≥ 0 (3.1)
for some p < 1.
Now suppose investment is efficient - so that a project invests only if cost of effort is low
and its type exceeds 1/R. A necessary condition for this to be true is that equation (3.1)
holds at p = 1/R. But at p = 1/R, the equation becomes 1 − T/R ≥ 0, implying
that R − T ≥ 0. This in turn implies that αp(R − T) > 0 for all types p. But this is
the participation constraint for projects who do not want to invest with high effort.
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Therefore low effort cannot be prevented - if cost of effort is high for a type, it invests
with low effort, and if cost of effort is low, it invests even if its type is below 1/R. Thus
investment is not efficient. Contradiction. This proves that efficiency is not attainable.
4 THE MONITORING MECHANISM
4.1 MONITORING AND SECOND BEST INVESTMENT
By spending CM, a monitor learns whether a project is facing a high or a low cost of
effort (i.e. whether it is efficient for a project to operate), and reports this information
to the center. Investment is allowed to proceed only if the monitor reports low cost.
We assume that the centre is “strong” in the following sense.
Assumption 1. (Strong Centre) If a monitor reports that a certain project faces high cost
of effort, the investor concerned has the option of appealing to the centre which then verifies
the cost (incurring a cost greater than CM), and if the monitor’s report turns out to be false,
reverses the decision against the investor and fines the monitor all fees received from all the
projets assigned to him.
The fact that it costs the centre more than CM to verify the cost of effort merely im-
plies that assigning peer monitors is efficiency improving over direct monitoring by
the centre. As shown later, the above assumption helps ensure that monitors have no
incentive to block projects by reporting falsely. Of course, submitting a report without
actually incurring the monitoring cost is still a potential problem, and taken into ac-
count explicitly to ensure incentive to monitor. A second potential problem is that a
monitor might collude with the investor and allow a project to proceed by reporting
low cost falsely. This is taken into account explicitly in designing a collusion-proof
mechanism.
For all projects with high cost of effort, social optimality requires not investing. For all
projects with a low cost of effort, the second-best investment cutoff under monitoring
(denoted psb) is given by psbR− CE = 1+ CM, i.e.
psb =
1+ CE + CM
R
(4.1)
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In other words, social optimality requires that all types below psb should become mon-
itors, all types above should become potential investors, and invest if cost of effort is
low. Note that if the cost of monitoring (CM) is zero, second best coincides with first
best.
4.2 OPTIMAL MONITORING DESIGN
An optimal monitoring mechanism ideally achieves the following.
1. Implement an efficient assignment of agents to roles of investors and monitors.
2. Induce monitors to undertake (costly) monitoring, and report truthfully to the
centre.
3. Satisfy individual rationality and budget balance.
4. Finally, if collusion between monitors and investors is possible, the mechanism
must also be collusion-proof.
We first construct a mechanism assuming there is no collusion. The issue of collusion is
taken up in section 4.3, which shows that the possibility of collusion does not add any
new binding constraint, i.e. the optimal monitoring mechanism we construct below is
also collusion-proof.
For each project under a monitor, a payment scheme for the monitor is given by Y =
(YS, YF, YNI) where YS and YF are the payments made to the monitor when investment
takes place and results in success and failure respectively, and YNI is the payment made
to the monitor when no investment takes place (i.e. the project is not operated). From
limited liability, a monitor cannot be paid a negative amount in any state. Thus YS ≥ 0,
YF ≥ 0, YNI ≥ 0.
Let p denote the average type of the investors. If the type p∗ is the investment cutoff,
then p = (1+ p∗)/2. We use the following notation. Given any average type x,
EYI(x) ≡ xYS + (1− x)YF (4.2)
Any payment scheme for the monitor must make it worthwhile for the monitor to incur
the cost of monitoring. By incurring the cost of monitoring for all projects assigned to
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him, the monitor receives an expected payoff of θ EYI (p) + (1− θ) YNI − CM for each
project. If for any positive measure of projects the monitor does not incur the cost of
monitoring and reports a high cost, a fraction θ of such reports would turn out false,
the owners of such projects would appeal to the centre, and, from assumption 1, the
payoff of the monitor would be zero. Thus assumption 1 implies that a monitor has no
incentive to stop investment by reporting a high cost without knowing the true cost. It
follows that if a monitor does not incur the cost of monitoring, he allows investment
to proceed, and gets a payoff of θ EYI (p) + (1− θ) EYI (αp).
Therefore the following incentive-to-monitor constraint must be satisfied:
θ EYI (p) + (1− θ) YNI − CM ≥ θ EYI (p) + (1− θ) EYI (αp). (ICM)
Further, the expression on the left hand side must be positive to ensure participation
by the monitor. However, from limited liability, YS ≥ 0 and YF ≥ 0, and thus both
EYI (p) and EYI (αp) are positive. Thus the participation constraint of the monitor is
satisfied whenever the incentive-to-monitor constraint is satisfied.
Note that once the monitoring cost is incurred, a monitor reports truthfully. Reporting
high cost falsely on any positive measure of projects reduces payoff to zero as above,
and so long as the investor cannot offer a side payment, nothing can be gained by
reporting low cost falsely. If collusion between monitors and investors is possible, the
latter is no longer true. This case is taken up later in this section.
A general form of repayment contract is given by (T, TF), where T (TF) is the payment
made by the investor in the success (failure) state. Let B ≥ 0 be a fixed base payment
to each investor paid irrespective of the state. Since B is a promised base payoff to all
agents, agents cannot be paid less than B - thus limited liability still implies TF ≤ 0.
As noted in the last section, any optimal contract sets TF = 0. Thus, without loss of
generality, a repayment contract can be specified simply as a payment T in the success
state. Thus any scheme of transfers (comprising payments to monitors and payments
by investors) is a vector (Y, B, T).
The payoff of a monitor is his expected payoff from a project (given by the left hand
side of (ICM)) times the number of projects under him. Since types below p∗ are mon-
itors, and those above p∗ are investors, each monitor is asked to report on (1− p∗)/p∗
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projects.(7) The investment cutoff type p∗ is thus given by the following participation
constraint for investors which says that the marginal investor (type p∗) must earn just
as much as a monitor(8):
θ
(
p∗(R− T)− CE
)
+ B =
(
1− p∗
p∗
)(
θEYI (p) + (1− θ) YNI − CM
)
. (PC I)
Finally, budget balance implies that the payment by investors must account for loan
repayments as well as payment to monitors. Note that an investor invests only when
his cost of effort is low, which happens with probability θ. Thus the total net amount
collected from investors is
∫ 1
p∗ θ(pT − 1)dp. The measure of monitors is p∗. The total
amount paid to monitors is therefore p∗(1− p∗)/p∗(θ EYI (p) + (1− θ) YNI) and the
total amount paid to investors, whose measure is (1− p∗), is (1− p∗)B. Therefore the
budget balance equation is given by
p∗
(
1− p∗
p∗
)
(θ EYI (p) + (1− θ) YNI) + (1− p∗)B = θ
∫ 1
p∗
(pT − 1)dp
Simplifying, we get
θ EYI (p) + (1− θ) YNI + B = θ (p T − 1) . (BB)
(ICM), (PC I), and (BB) characterize the constraints that an optimal mechanism must
satisfy.
If either YS or YF is strictly positive, then from (4.2), both EYI (p) and EYI (αp) are
strictly positive, and this only makes it harder to satisfy the incentive-to-monitor con-
straint (ICM). Thus the optimal payment scheme to monitors involves Y∗S = Y
∗
F = 0
(the superscript denotes optimal values). The following result shows this formally (all
proofs are collected in the appendix).
Lemma 1. Under the optimal contract, Y∗S = Y
∗
F = 0.
(7)If (1− p∗)/p∗ < 1, then this is the probability with which a monitor is asked to report on a project.
(8)In general, the participation constraint for investors requires
θ (p∗(R− T)− CE) + B ≥
(
1− p∗
p∗
)
(θEYI (p) + (1− θ) YNI − CM) .
However, suppose strict inequality holds. Then there exists a type p˜ < p∗ such that θ ( p˜(R− T)− CE)
exceeds the right hand side above. Thus such a type would rather invest than monitor. Then p∗ cannot
be the investment cutoff. This shows that the participation constraint must hold with equality.
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The following result characterizes the optimal mechanism.
Proposition 1. The optimal transfer scheme is given by (Y∗, B∗, T∗) where B∗ = θCE, T∗ =
R, and Y∗ = (Y∗S , Y
∗
F , Y
∗
NI) is given by Y
∗
S = Y
∗
F = 0, and Y
∗
NI = CM/(1− θ). The optimal
scheme attains second best and balances the budget whenever R > Rmin, where
Rmin = (1+ CE + CM) + 2CM
(
1− θ
θ
)
(4.3)
For R < Rmin, the transfer scheme attains the second best but incurs a budget deficit of
D = CM(1− θ)− θ2 (R− (1+ CE + CM))
The result shows that optimal monitoring fails to attain second best. In order to attain
second best, a mechanism must implement the second best cutoff psb whenever psb <
1, i.e. whenever R > 1 + CE + CM. Thus second best requires Rmin = 1 + CE + CM.
However, the result above shows that Rmin > 1+ CE + CM, and therefore the outcome
is inefficient with respect to the second best.
Note that as either θ → 1 (i.e. probability that the cost of effort is high vanishes), the
inefficiency vanishes. The reason is that as θ grows, it becomes easier to satisfy the
incentive to monitor constraint (ICM). Further, as the cost of monitoring CM → 0,
again the inefficiency vanishes - and also second best coincides with first best. Thus if
there is no cost of monitoring, the monitoring mechanism attains first best.
4.3 OPTIMAL MONITORING DESIGN UNDER COLLUSION
Collusion here implies that an investor can make side payments to the monitor. This
adds a further constraint. Once CM is incurred, and the monitor discovers that the
effort cost is high, he should report this truthfully - and not be persuaded by any bribe
offer by the investor. An investor receives a base payment of B irrespective of whether
he actually invests. Therefore an investor does not have any incentive to offer any part
of this as a bribe in order to be allowed to invest. Therefore the maximum bribe that an
investor can offer (any such offer is a payment promised in the success state) is R− T.
This translates into an expected payoff of αp(R− T) for the monitor. Not accepting a
bribe (and reporting high cost truthfully) leads to the project not being funded and this
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earns the monitor a payoff of YNI. This explains the following “no-successful-bribe”
constraint:
YNI ≥ αp(R− T) + EYI (αp). (4.4)
Now, the optimal contract is given by T∗ = R, Y∗S = Y
∗
F = 0. Thus the constraint above
reduces to YNI > 0. But Y∗NI = CM/(1− θ) > 0. Thus the constraint does not bind, and
the scope of monitoring remains exactly the same under collusion - the possibility of
collusion does not add any extra binding constraint.
Further, so long as there is a strong centre, monitors gain nothing by colluding. Specif-
ically, if a monitor does not incur the cost of monitoring, assumption 1 ensures that
he does not stop any project. Collusion does not help in this regard. Second, once a
monitor does incur the monitoring cost, he has no power to demand ant payments to
allow a low-cost investor to proceed. As in the other case, collusion between monitors
does not help.
The discussion above proves the following result.
Proposition 2. The optimal monitoring mechanism is proof against collusion between a mon-
itor and an investor, as well as collusion among monitors.
4.4 REMOVING ASSUMPTION 1: ENTRENCHED MONITORS AND GATEKEEPING
Finally, consider the consequences of removing the strong-centre assumption (assump-
tion 1). If it holds, monitors do not stop projects without investing in monitoring. Once
the assumption is removed, monitors become entrenched and function effectively as
gatekeepers. Specifically, since a monitor can now block a project arbitrarily (with-
out incurring any costs), he can demand a side-payment in order to deliver a favor-
able report. Thus the report of the monitor is now exactly like a permit granted by a
gatekeeper, and the constraints faced by a monitoring mechanism coincide with those
facing a gatekeeping mechanism. This proves the following result.
Proposition 3. If assumption 1 does not hold, the monitoring mechanism coincides with the
gatekeeping mechanism.
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5 A GATEKEEPING MECHANISM
A monitor expends resources to learn the state and report on the realized cost of effort
for a project, while a gatekeeper is simply allocated extra property rights as follows.
Under gatekeeping, an investor must obtain a permit (granted by a gatekeeper) in
order to be able to obtain a loan from the centre and proceed with his project. Once
a project applies to a gatekeeper, the gatekeeper (who does not spend any resources
to learn the state) chooses a message from the pair {YES,NO}. If a gatekeeper does
not grant a permit to a project (i.e. chooses message ‘NO’), the investor can apply to
another gatekeeper.
For each project under a gatekeeper, consider a payment scheme (for the gatekeeper)
Y = (YS, YF, YNI) where YS and YF are the payments made to the gatekeeper when he
says ‘YES,’ and investment results in success and failure respectively, and YNI is the
payment made to the gatekeeper when he says ‘NO’ and blocks a project.
By saying ‘NO’ a gatekeeper can always earn YNI. Thus to make him say ‘YES,’ an
investor might need to make a side payment so that the payoff of the gatekeeper by
allowing an investment is at least YNI. Further, since an investor can apply to other
gatekeepers if one gatekeeper says ‘NO,’ no single gatekeeper can expect to earn more
than YNI through side payments. Thus setting YNI also sets the rent extraction capacity
of the gatekeepers.
We now discuss the constraints faced by a gatekeeping mechanism.
If the private cost is high, an investor would want to produce with a low level of private
inputs and effort. Such an investor can offer at most (R − T) as side payment to the
gatekeeper. If a gatekeeper says ‘YES’ to a project that offers at most (R − T) in the
success state, he receives at most
(
α p YS + (1− α p)YF
)
+ αp(R− T). By saying ‘NO’
he receives YNI. For the latter to be incentive compatible, the following constraint (no
successful side payment by low effort projects) must be satisfied.
YNI ≥
(
α p YS + (1− α p)YF
)
+ αp(R− T). (Block Low Effort)
Further, it must be incentive compatible to say ‘YES’ when the investor has low cost of
effort and intends to invest with high effort. Let S denote the side payment in this case.
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Thus S must be high enough so that the following no-refusal-for-high-effort constraint
is satisfied:
YNI ≤ (1− θ)YNI + θ
[(
p YS + (1− p)YF
)
+ pS
]
.
Under competition, the equilibrium side payment just ensures incentive compatibility
- implying that the inequality above is satisfied with equality. Solving for S, and using
(4.2),
S∗ = YNI − EYI (p)
p
. (Side Payment)
Lemma 2. Limited liability is satisfied if YNI > 0.
An important implication of the result above is that the signs of YS and YF are unre-
stricted. Recall that under peer monitoring, limited liability required these to be non-
negative in addition to YNI > 0. The difference is caused by the explicit incorporation
of side-payments in the gatekeeping mechanism.
This implies that irrespective of whether investment takes place, the payoff of a gate-
keeper is given by YNI(9). To ensure participation by a gatekeeper, YNI must be positive.
YNI ≥ 0. (PC G)
Given (Block Low Effort), (Side Payment), and (PC G), only low-effort-cost investors
apply to a gatekeeper, offer the right side-payment, and gatekeepers say ‘YES’ to all
such projects.
The cutoff p∗ is then given by the following indifference condition of the marginal in-
vestor. Whenever appropriate, the constraints in this section appear with a superscript
“g” (denoting gatekeeping) to differentiate with similar constraints under monitoring
design (section 4.2).
θ
(
p∗(R− T − S∗)− CE
)
=
(
1− p∗
p∗
)
YNI, (PC
g
I)
(9)Note that there is no additional constraint on S requiring it to be non-negative, although it turns
out that S ≥ 0 in equilibrium. Thus even if transfers from gatekeepers to investors are considered
unreasonable, explicitly requiring S to be non-negative does not change anything.
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Given any such cutoff p∗, all types p ≥ p∗ become investors, and obtain a permit by
providing the right side-payment from a gatekeepers whenever cost of effort is low
(and do not invest otherwise), and all types p < p∗ become gatekeepers.
Finally, the budget balance equation is given by
(1− θ) YNI + θ EYI (p) = θ (p T − 1) (BBg)
The five constraints above - (Block Low Effort), (Side Payment), (PC G), (PC
g
I), and
(BBg) - characterize the optimal gatekeeping mechanism.
The following result now shows that optimal gatekeeping can implement first best.
Proposition 4. The gatekeeping mechanism with the transfer scheme (Y∗, T∗, S∗) described
below balances the budget and attains first best.
• Each investor pays T∗ in the success state, and zero otherwise, where T∗ is given by
T∗ = R
(1+ CE)2 + R2
(2R− α((1+ CE)2 + R2))
(1− α) .
• Each gatekeeper receives a side payment of S∗ from each project allowed to proceed, where
S∗ = α
(1− α)
R
[
(R− (1+ CE))2 + 2CER
]
((1+ CE)2 + R2)
.
• Each gatekeeper receives Y∗NI whenever investment does not take place, and if investment
takes place, then Y∗S in the success state, and Y
∗
F otherwise, where
Y∗NI =
θ(1+ CE)(R− (1+ CE))
(1+ CE)2 + R2
Y∗S = Y
∗
F = Y
∗
NI −
(R + 1+ CE)
2R
S∗.
Recall that the outcome under monitoring could at best attain second best (the second
best differs from the first best because there is a cost of monitoring) - and in fact the out-
come under optimal monitoring is inefficient with respect to even second best - second
best is attained only if R > Rmin, where the latter is given by equation (4.3). Gatekeep-
ing, on the other hand, attains first best whenever R > (1+CE), i.e. whenever the first
best level of investment is positive.
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However, as cost of monitoring CM → 0, second best coincides with first best, and the
inefficiency of monitoring goes to zero as well. Thus as the cost of monitoring goes to
zero, the advantage of gatekeeping over monitoring vanishes.
5.1 COLLUDING GATEKEEPERS
This section explores the consequences of violation of the assumption of competitive
gatekeepers. As pointed out by Murphy et al. (1991), one mechanism through which
the grabbing hand operates is misallocation of talent. Solving the problem of assign-
ment is at the heart of both gatekeeping and monitoring mechanisms described in ear-
lier sections. We show first how this ability might fail under gatekeeping even though
the centre itself is still strong. In a local environment, where gatekeepers know each
other quite well, collusion among gatekeepers is possible. This gives rise to the follow-
ing problem.
Proposition 5. If gatekeepers collude, the gatekeeping mechanism dissipates incentive to in-
vest.
The intuition is as follows. Once some types choose to invest, the marginal type that
invests cannot earn a positive payoff. If the marginal investor earns a strictly positive
payoff, the joint profit of gatekeepers can be increased by setting the acceptable level
of side-payment offers higher. This in turn implies that some positive measure of in-
vestors close to the marginal type would rather be gatekeepers - violating the original
assignment. Thus no investment is possible - collusion distorts allocation of talent.
6 DISCUSSION
Let us first summarize the results. We show the following.
• The optimal monitoring mechanism solves the problem of assignment of agents to
the roles of monitors and investors, and induces the former to carry out costly mon-
itoring which in turn ensures efficient investment. However, the cost of monitoring
coupled with the assignment problem implies that the optimal mechanism is ineffi-
cient compared to second best. In the limit as the cost of monitoring goes to zero, first
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best efficiency is recovered.
• The optimal monitoring mechanism is proof against collusion between monitors as
well as collusion between monitors and investors.
• The optimal gatekeeping mechanism solves the assignment problem, and induces
efficient investment by allowing side payments from investors to gatekeepers. The
mechanism attains first best and outperforms monitoring.
• A gatekeeping mechanism allows side payments, and therefore any further concern
about collusion between gatekeepers and investors does not arise.
• The crucial assumption for the monitoring mechanism to work is that the center
is strong so that it can penalize monitors. If this “strong centre” assumption does
not hold, monitoring reduces to gatekeeping, and therefore monitoring is no longer
available as a separate mechanism. The crucial assumption behind gatekeeping is that
gatekeepers behave competitively. If gatekeepers can collude, gatekeeping dissipates
investment incentives.
The results show that if both “strong centre” and “competitive gatekeepers” assump-
tions hold, gatekeeping outperforms monitoring. However, as the cost of monitor-
ing goes to zero, the advantage of gatekeeping over monitoring vanishes. Further, if
gatekeepers can collude, but the strong center assumption holds, monitoring performs
better than gatekeeping. This is because collusion among gatekeepers causes a fail-
ure in assignment, and dissipates incentive to invest, but the same is not true under
monitoring, which is immune to collusive arrangements. Thus in a collective credit
organization with a strong centre, whenever there is a possibility that agents could
collude, monitoring is likely to perform better than gatekeeping.
7 CONCLUSION
Collective credit organizations face a host of problems in designing incentives to gener-
ate efficient investment. These include efficient assignment (i.e. the division of agents
between borrowing and non-borrowing members), free riding among monitors, and
collusion between investors and monitors. This paper derives monitoring as well as
gatekeeping mechanisms designed to address these issues in a collective credit organi-
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zation.
We assume that the implementing centre it itself strong in the sense that it can inves-
tigate complaints about false reports by monitors, and has the ability to penalize any
monitoring agent who submits such a report, thereby removing the incentive to do
so. We analyze optimal monitoring under this assumption. The problem of free rid-
ing can be preempted by attaching specific monitors to projects. Further, we show
that under optimal monitoring, the possibility of collusion between monitors and in-
vestors does not add an extra binding constraint. A gatekeeping mechanism, on the
other hand, explicitly accounts for side-payments from investors to gatekeepers, and
is also collusion-proof by design. However, even though such collusion is not a prob-
lem under monitoring, it turns out that solving the assignment problem, coupled with
the need to provide incentive to monitor, requires sacrificing efficiency in some cases.
Gatekeeping, on the other hand, implements the efficient outcome, and performs better
than monitoring.
The basic intuition for this result is that while a monitor needs to be encouraged to seek
information by incurring a cost, the default under gatekeeping is to deny credit - and
therefore it is the informed party that seeks gatekeepers, and reveals private informa-
tion about cost of effort through side payments. At the same time, competition among
gatekeepers limits their rent seeking ability. The upshot is that gatekeeping solves the
assignment problem without loss of efficiency, while also saving on the monitoring
cost, and performs better than monitoring.
As monitoring cost goes to zero, the advantage of gatekeeping over monitoring goes
to zero. Further, if gatekeepers can themselves collude, gatekeeping dissipates incen-
tive to invest, while under monitoring, monitors do not gain by colluding. If a lot of
local information is available, monitoring cost is likely to be low, and local interaction
makes collusion among gatekeepers possible. This might explain why non-market
credit institutions often rely on monitoring mechanisms. On the other hand, if the
implementing centre is itself weak, so that investors have no recourse against rogue
monitors who block projects by falsely reporting against them, the constraints arising
under monitoring coincide with those under gatekeeping. The plausibility of a weak
centre in the context of government regulation therefore explains why the distortion of
gatekeeping rather than monitoring serves as the natural focus in addressing issues of
corruption.
20
APPENDIX: PROOFS
A.1 PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let θEYI (p) + (1− θ)EYI (αp) ≡ φ. Using (BB) we can rewrite constraints (ICM) and
(PC I) as
θ (p T − 1)− CM ≥ φ (IC ′M)
θ (p∗ (R− T)− CE) + B =
(
1− p∗
p∗
)
(θ(p T − 1)− CM) . (PC ′I)
Putting p∗ = psb and solving for T from (PC
′
I), we get
T∗ = 2
θ(1+ psb2)
(
B + θ + CM(1− psb(1− θ))
)
(A.1)
Using this, (IC
′
M) is satisfied for psb ∈ [pL(φ), pU(φ)] where
pL(φ) =
K−√K2 − 4φH(φ)
2H(φ)
and
pU(φ) =
K +
√
K2 − 4φH(φ)
2H(φ)
where K = B + θ(1 + CM) and H(φ) = B + θ + φ+ CM(2− θ). Since H′(φ) > 0, it is
easy to see that
dpL(φ)
dφ
< 0 and
dpU(φ)
dφ
> 0. Thus reducing φ increases the range of
parameters for which second best can be achieved. Therefore it is optimal to set φ = 0.
Now, φ = βYS + (1− β)YF, where β = (θ + (1− θ)α)p < 1. Since YS ≥ 0, and YF ≥ 0,
φ = 0 implies that Y∗S = Y
∗
F = 0. h
A.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From lemma 1, EYI (p)
∗ = 0. Using this, the three constraints (ICM), (PC I), and (BB)
can be rewritten as
(1− θ) YNI − CM > 0 (A.2)
θ
(
p∗(R− T)− CE
)
+ B =
(
1− p∗
p∗
)(
(1− θ) YNI − CM
)
(A.3)
(1− θ) YNI + B = θ (p T − 1) (A.4)
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From the proof of this lemma above, we know that second best can be implemented
for psb ∈ [pL(φ), pU(φ)]. Further, at φ = 0, pL(0) = 0 and
pU(0) =
B + θ(1+ CM)
B + θ + CM(2− θ) (A.5)
Thus second best can be implemented for psb 6 pU(0). Now,
∂pU(0)
∂B
=
2CM(1− θ)
B + θ + CM(2− θ) > 0
Thus to maximize the scope of implementing second best, B should be set to its highest
possible value. From (A.4), this implies YNI should be set as low as possible, and T as
high as possible. This implies, from (A.2), YNI =
CM
(1− θ) . Further, the highest possible
value of T is R. Therefore we have
EYI (p)
∗ = 0, YNI∗ =
CM
(1− θ) , T
∗ = R
Using these, and using p∗ = psb, equation (A.3) becomes
−θCE + B = 0
Thus B∗ = θCE.
Finally, using these values,
pU(0) =
θ(1+ CM + CE)
θ(1+ CM + CE) + 2CM(1− θ)
Since psb = (1+ CE + CM)/R, this can be equivalently written as
R > Rmin ≡ (1+ CE + CM) + 2CM 1− θ
θ
Finally, for R < Rmin, the budget deficit is given by
CM + θCE − θ
(
1+ psb
2
R− 1
)
which simplifies to the expression given in the statement of the proposition. h
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A.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
From the budget balance equation (BBg),
YNI =
θ
(1− θ)
(
p T − EYI (p)− 1
)
. (A.6)
Solving for T from equation (PCgI),
T =
EYI (p)−YNI
p
+
R
(
θYNI(1+ CE)− (R− (1+ CE))
)
θYNI(1+ CE)2
(A.7)
To implement first best, set p∗ = pfb =
1+ CE
R
. Substituting the value of T from
equation (A.7) in equation (A.6),
Y∗NI =
θ(1+ CE)(R− (1+ CE))
(1+ CE)2 + R2
. (A.8)
Using the value of T and Y∗NI, condition (Block Low Effort) becomes
YF ≤ Y∗NI −
(R + 1+ CE)
2R
α
(1− α)
R
[
(R− (1+ CE))2 + 2CER
]
((1+ CE)2 + R2)
Set YF so that this holds with equality.
How should YS be set? Using the value of YF, Y∗NI and T from above, the budget balance
equation (given by (BBg)) becomes
T + S =
2R2
(1+ CE)2 + R2
.
where S is the value of the side payment from (Side Payment). Thus YS merely af-
fects the division of the right hand side between T∗ and S∗. As YS increases, EYI (pfb)
increases, and thus (from equation (A.7)), T increases (and S becomes smaller). For
simplicity, set Y∗S = Y
∗
F .
Finally, since Y∗S = Y
∗
F , it is also true that EYI (pfb) = Y
∗
S = Y
∗
F . Using this in equa-
tions (A.7) and (Side Payment), the claimed values of T∗ and S∗ are obtained.
This completes the proof. h
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A.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
If gatekeepers collude, they choose the level of side payment required to produce a
‘YES’ response so as to maximize joint payoff. Suppose there is a strictly positive mea-
sure of types who invest - i.e. there is an investment cutoff type θ∗ < 1. To satisfy the
participation constraint, it must be that pi(θ∗) ≥ 0.
First, in equilibrium the joint payoff of the gatekeepers is strictly positive. Suppose on
the contrary that joint profit is zero. Since payoff of investors is strictly increasing in
type, for any θ > θ∗, pi(θ) > 0. If side payment is raised by a small amount, some
investors do not participate any more - but there is still a strictly positive measure of
investing agents who pay the new side payment - and therefore the joint payoff of
gatekeepers become strictly positive. Thus the joint profit cannot be zero in equilib-
rium. Therefore each gatekeeper earns a strictly positive payoff in equilibrium (if a
gatekeeper earns a zero payoff by participating in collusion, he can express willing-
ness to say ‘YES’ when offered a slightly lower side payment, attract a lot of projects
and make a positive payoff).
Second, note that there is no equilibrium with pi(θ∗) ≥ 0. If pi(θ∗) > 0, a higher
side payment can be charged to all investors without affecting participation decision,
raising joint profit. If, on the other hand, pi(θ∗) = 0, there is an e > 0 such that
investors of type θ ∈ [θ∗, θ∗ + e) strictly prefer being gatekeepers than investors. Thus
there is no equilibrium with pi(θ∗) ≥ 0 for any θ∗ < 1. This implies that there is
no equilibrium with any positive level of investment. Collusion among gatekeepers
dissipates investment incentives completely. h
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